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WHEN IS MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCREENING A CONVEX PROGRAM?∗
ALESSIO FIGALLI†, YOUNG-HEON KIM‡ AND ROBERT J. MCCANN§
Abstract. A principal wishes to transact business with a multidimensional distribution of agents
whose preferences are known only in the aggregate. Assuming a twist (= generalized Spence-
Mirrlees single-crossing) hypothesis and that agents can choose only pure strategies, we identify a
structural condition on the preference b(x, y) of agent type x for product type y — and on the prin-
cipal’s costs c(y) — which is necessary and sufficient for reducing the profit maximization problem
faced by the principal to a convex program. This is a key step toward making the principal’s prob-
lem theoretically and computationally tractable; in particular, it allows us to derive uniqueness
and stability of the principal’s optimum strategy — and similarly of the strategy maximizing the
expected welfare of the agents when the principal’s profitability is constrained. We call this con-
dition non-negative cross-curvature: it is also (i) necessary and sufficient to guarantee convexity
of the set of b-convex functions, (ii) invariant under reparametrization of agent and/or product
types by diffeomorphisms, and (iii) a strengthening of Ma, Trudinger and Wang’s necessary and
sufficient condition (A3w) for continuity of the correspondence between an exogenously prescribed
distribution of agents and of products. We derive the persistence of economic effects such as the
desirability for a monopoly to establish prices so high they effectively exclude a positive fraction
of its potential customers, in nearly the full range of non-negatively cross-curved models.
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1. Introduction
The principal-agent paradigm provides a microeconomic framework for modeling non-competitive
decision problems which must be made in the face of informational asymmetry. Such problems range
frommonopolist nonlinear pricing [46] [60] [22] [66] [3] and product line design (“customer screening”)
[54] [37] [50], to optimal taxation [42] [43], labour market signalling and contract theory [58] [59]
[2], regulation of monopolies [5] [38] [32] [28] [4] including public utilities [47] [9], and mechanism
design [23] [39] [45]. A typical example would be the problem faced by a monopolist who wants
to market automobiles y ∈ Y to a population of potential buyers (“agents”) x ∈ X . Knowing the
preferences b(x, y) of buyer x for car y, the relative frequency dµ(x) of different buyer types in the
population, and the cost c(y) she incurs in manufacturing car type y, the principal needs to decide
which products (or product bundles) to manufacture and how much to charge for each of them, so
as to maximize her profits.
In the simplest models, e.g. [58] [54], there are only a finite number of product possibilities
(e.g. with air conditioning, or without) and a finite number of buyer types (e.g. rich, middle-class,
and poor); or possibly a one-dimensional continuum of product possibilities (parameterized, say, by
quality) and of agent types (parameterized, say, by income) [42] [59] [46] [5]. Of course, real cars
depend on more than one parameter — fuel efficiency, comfort, options, reliability, styling, handling
and safety, to name a few — as do car shoppers, who vary in wealth, income, age, commuting
needs, family size, personal disposition, etc. Thus realistic modeling requires multidimensional type
spaces X ⊂ Rm and Y ⊂ Rn as in [39] [65] [44] [51] [7] [16]. Although such models can often be
reduced to optimization problems in the calculus of variations [13] [6], in the absence of convexity
they remain dauntingly difficult to analyze. Convexity — whether manifest or hidden — rules out
critical points other than global minima, and is often the key to locating and characterizing optimal
strategies either numerically or theoretically. The purpose of the present article is to determine
when convexity is present, assuming the dimensions m = n of the agent and product type spaces
coincide.
An archetypal model was addressed by Wilson [66], Armstrong [3], and Rochet and Chone´ [50]. A
particular example from the last of these studies makes the simplifying hypotheses X = Y = [0,∞[n,
c(y) = |y|2/2, and b(x, y) = 〈x, y〉. By assuming this bilinearity of buyer preferences, Rochet and
Chone´ were able to show that the principal’s problem can be reduced to a quadratic minimization
over the set of non-negative convex functions — itself a convex set. Although the convexity constraint
makes this variational problem non-standard, for buyers distributed uniformly throughout the unit
square, they exploited a combination of theoretical and computational analysis to show a number
of results of economic interest. Their most striking conclusion was that the profit motive alone
leads the principal to discriminate between three different types of buyers: (i) low-end customers
whom she will not market cars to, because — as Armstrong had already discovered — making cars
affordable to this segment of the market would cost her too much of her mid-range and high-end
profits; (ii) mid-range customers, whom she will encourage to choose from a one-parameter family
of affordably-priced compromise vehicles; (iii) high-end customers, whom she will use both available
dimensions of her product space to market expensive vehicles individually tailored to suit each
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customer’s desires. Whether or not such bunching phenomena are robust is an unanswered question
of considerable interest which — due to their specificity to particular preference functions — the
techniques of the foregoing authors remain unable to address. The possibility of non-robustness
was highlighted in [7]; below we go further to suggest which specific perturbations of the preference
function b(x, y) are most likely to yield robust results. On the other hand, our conclusions confirm
Armstrong’s assertion that what he called the desirability of exclusion is a very general phenomenon
in the models we study (Theorem 4.7). This exclusion however, is not generic when the dimensions
of the type and allocation spaces differ [16]: Deneckere and Severinov gave necessary and sufficient
conditions for exclusion when (m,n) = (2, 1).
For general preferences b(x, y), the principal’s problem can be reformulated as a minimimization
problem over the space of b-convex functions (Definition 3.1), according to Carlier [13]. Such func-
tions generally form a compact but non-convex set, which prevented Carlier from deducing much
more than the existence of an optimal strategy for the principal — a result which can also be
obtained using the method of Monteiro and Page [45]; (for related developments see Basov [7] or
Rochet and Stole [51]). Our present purpose is to identify conditions on the agent preferences which
guarantee convexity of this feasible set (Theorem 3.2). In the setting we choose, the conditions we
find will actually be necessary as well as sufficient for convexity; this necessity imparts a significance
to these conditions even if they appear unexpected or unfamiliar. If, in addition, the principal’s
manufacturing cost c(y) is b∗-convex, for b∗(y, x) := b(x, y), the principal’s problem becomes a
convex program which renders it much more amenable to standard theoretical and computational
techniques. Although the resulting problem retains the complexities of the Wilson, Armstrong, and
Rochet and Chone´’s models, we are able to deduce new results which remained inaccessible until
now, such as conditions guaranteeing uniqueness (Theorem 4.5) and stability (Corollary 4.6) of the
principal’s optimum strategy. The same considerations and results apply also to the problem of
maximimizing the total welfare of the agents under the constraint that it remain possible for the
principal to operate without sustaining a loss (Remark 5.1).
The initial impetus for this study emerged from discussions with Ivar Ekeland. RJM is pleased to
express his gratitude to Ekeland for introducing him to the principal-agent problem in 1996, and for
anticipating already at that time that it ought to be tackled using techniques from the mathematical
theory of optimal transportation. This approach was exploited by Carlier [13] in his doctoral thesis,
following earlier works by Rochet [48] [49] and Rochet and Chone´ [50], and was recently extended to
a different but related class of problems by Buttazzo and Carlier [10]. We are grateful to Giuseppe
Buttazzo and Guillaume Carlier also, for stimulating discussions.
2. Hypotheses: the basic framework
As in Ma, Trudinger and Wang’s work concerning the smoothness of optimal mappings [36], let
us assume the buyer preferences satisfy the following hypotheses. Let X denote the closure of any
given set X ⊂ Rn, and for each (x0, y0) ∈ X × Y assume:
(B0) b ∈ C4
(
X × Y
)
, where X ⊂ Rn and Y ⊂ Rn are open and bounded;
(B1) (bi-twist)
y ∈ Y 7−→ Dxb(x0, y)
x ∈ X 7−→ Dyb(x, y0)
}
are diffeomorphisms onto their ranges;
(B2) (bi-convexity)
Xy0 := Dyb(X, y0)
Yx0 := Dxb(x0, Y )
}
are convex subsets of Rn.
Here the subscript x0 serves as a reminder that Yx0 denotes a subset of the cotangent space
T ∗x0X= R
n to X at x0. Note (B1) is strengthened form of the multidimensional generalization
[55] [20] [31] of the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition expressed in Ru¨schendorf, in Gangbo,
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and in Levin. It asserts the marginal utility of buyer type x0 in equation (4.2) determines the
product he selects uniquely and smoothly, and similarly that buyer type who selects product y0 will
be a well-defined smooth function of y0 and the marginal cost of that product; (B1) is much less
restrictive than the generalized single crossing condition proposed by McAfee and McMillan [39],
since the iso-price curves in the latter context become hyperplanes, effectively reducing the problem
to a single dimension. We also assume
(B3) (non-negative cross-curvature)
(2.1)
∂4
∂s2∂t2
∣∣∣∣
(s,t)=(0,0)
b(x(s), y(t)) ≥ 0
for each curve t ∈ [−1, 1] 7−→ (Dyb(x(t), y(0)), Dxb(x(0), y(t))) forming an affinely parameterized
line segment in Xy(0)×Y x(0) ⊂ R
2n. If the inequality (2.1) becomes strict whenever x′(0) and y′(0)
are non-vanishing, we say the preference function b is positively cross-curved, and denote this by
(B3u).
Remark 2.1 (Mathematical lineage). Condition (B3) can alternately be defined as in Lemma 6.1
using Definition 4.1; the convexity asserted by that lemma may appear more intuitive and natural
than (B3) from point of view of applications. Historically, non-negative cross-curvature arose as a
strengthening of Trudinger and Wang’s criterion (A3w) guaranteeing smoothness of optimal maps in
the Monge-Kantorovich transportation problem [62]; unlike us, they require (2.1) only if, in addition,
(2.2)
∂2
∂s∂t
∣∣∣∣
(s,t)=(0,0)
b(x(s), y(t)) = 0.
Necessity of Trudinger and Wang’s condition for continuity was shown by Loeper [33], who (like [25]
[61]) also noted its covariance and some of its relations to the geometric notion of curvature. Their
condition relaxes a hypothesis proposed with Ma [36], which required strict positivity of (2.1) when
(2.2) holds. The strengthening considered here was first studied in a different but equivalent form
by Kim and McCann, where both the original and the modified conditions were shown to corre-
spond to pseudo-Riemannian sectional curvature conditions induced by buyer preferences on X×Y ,
thus highlighting their invariance under reparametrization of either X or Y by diffeomorphism; see
Lemma 4.5 of [25]. Other variants and refinements of Ma, Trudinger, and Wang’s condition have
been proposed and investigated by Figalli and Rifford [19] and Loeper and Villani [35] for different
purposes at about the same time.
Kim and McCann showed non-negative cross-curvature guarantees tensorizability of condition
(B3), which is useful for building examples of preference functions which satisfy it [26]; in suitable
coordinates, it guarantees convexity of each b-convex function, as they showed with Figalli [18]; see
Proposition 4.3. Hereafter we show, in addition, that it is necessary and sufficient to guarantee con-
vexity of the set Vb
Y
of b-convex functions. A variant on the sufficiency was observed simultaneously
and independently from us in a different context by Sei (Lemma 1 of [57]), who was interested in the
function b(x, y) = −d2Sn(x, y), and used it to give a convex parametrization of a family of statistical
densities he introduced on the round sphere X = Y = Sn.
3. Results concerning the principal-agent problem
A mathematical concept of central relevance to us is encoded in the following definition.
Definition 3.1 (b-convex). A function u : X 7−→ R is called b-convex if u = (ub
∗
)b, where
(3.1) vb(x) = sup
y∈Y
b(x, y)− v(y) and ub
∗
(y) = sup
x∈X
b(x, y)− u(x).
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In other words, if u is its own second b-transform, i.e. a supremal convolution (or generalized
Legendre transform) of some function v : Y 7−→ R ∪ {+∞} with b. The set of b-convex functions
will be denoted by Vb
Y
. Similarly, we define the set Ub
∗
X
of b∗-convex functions to consist of those
v : Y 7−→ R satisfying v = (vb)b
∗
.
Although some authors permit b-convex functions to take the value +∞, our hypothesis (B0)
ensures b-convex functions are Lipschitz continuous and thus that the suprema defining their b-
transforms are finitely attained. Our first result is the following.
Theorem 3.2 (b-convex functions form a convex set). Assuming b : X × Y 7−→ R satisfies (B0)–
(B2), hypothesis (B3) becomes necessary and sufficient for the convexity of the set Vb
Y
of b-convex
functions on X.
To understand the relevance of this theorem to economic theory, let us recall a mathematical
formulation of the principal-agent problem based on [13] and [48] [49]. In this context, each product
y ∈ Y costs the principal c(y) to manufacture, and she is free to market this product to the population
X of agents at any lower semicontinuous price v(y) that she chooses. She is aware that product y
has utility b(x, y) to agent x ∈ X , and that in response to any price menu v(y) she proposes, each
agent will compute his indirect utility
(3.2) u(x) = vb(x) := max
y∈Y
b(x, y)− v(y),
and will choose to buy a product yb,v(x) which attains the maximum, meaning u(x) = b(x, yb,v(x))−
v(yb,v(x)). However, let us assume that there is a distinguished point y∅ ∈ Y representing the null
product, which the principal is compelled to offer to agents at zero profit,
(3.3) v(y∅) = c(y∅),
either because both quantities vanish (representing the null transaction), or because, as in [10], there
is a competing supplier or regulator from whom the agents can obtain this product at price c(y∅). In
other words, u∅(x) := b(x, y∅)− c(y∅) acts as the reservation utility of agent x ∈ X , below which he
will reject the principal’s offers and decline to participate, whence u ≥ u∅. The map yb,v : X 7−→ Y
from agents to products they select will not be continuous except possibly if the price menu v is
b∗-convex; when yb,v(x) depends continuously on x ∈ X we say v is strictly b
∗-convex.
Knowing b, c and a (Borel) probability measure µ on X — representing the relative frequency
of different types of agents in the population — the principal’s problem is to decide which lower
semicontinuous price menu v : Y 7−→ R ∪ {+∞} maximizes her profits, or equivalently, minimizes
her net losses:
(3.4)
∫
X
[c(yb,v(x))) − v(yb,v(x))]dµ(x).
Note the integrand vanishes (3.3)–(3.4) for any agent x who elects not to participate (i.e., who
chooses the null product y∅ ∈ Y ).
For absolutely continuous distributions of agents, — or more generally if µ vanishes on Lipschitz
hypersurfaces — it is known that the principal’s losses (3.4) depend on v only through the indirect
utility u = vb, an observation which can be traced back to Mirrlees [42] in one dimension and
Rochet [48] more generally; see also Carlier [13]. This indirect utility u ≥ u∅ is b-convex, due to the
well-known identity ((vb)b
∗
)b = vb; see for instance Exercise 2.35 at page 87 of [63]. Conversely, the
principal can design any b-convex function u ≥ u∅ that she wishes simply by choosing price strategy
v = ub
∗
. Thus, as detailed below, the principal’s problem can be reformulated as a minimization
problem (4.5) on the set U0 := {u ∈ V
b
Y
| u ≥ u∅}. Under hypotheses (B0)–(B3), our Theorem 3.2
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shows the set Vb
Y
of such utilities u to be convex, in the usual sense. This represents substantial
progress, even though the minimization problem (3.4) still depends nonlinearly on v = ub
∗
. If, in
addition, the principal’s cost c(y) is a b∗-convex function, then Proposition 4.3 and its corollary show
her minimization problem (3.4) becomes a convex functional of u on U0, so the principal’s problem
reduces to a convex program. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a minimum can in principle
then be expressed using Kuhn-Tucker type conditions, and numerical examples could be solved using
standard algorithms. However we do not do this here: unless µ is taken to be a finite combination of
Dirac masses, the infinite dimensionality of the convex set Vb
Y
leads to functional analytic subtleties
even for the bilinear preference function b(x, y) = 〈x, y〉, which have only been resolved with partial
success by Rochet and Chone´ in that case [50] [14]. If the b∗-convexity of c(y) is strict however, or if
the preference function is positively cross-curved (B3u), we shall show the principal’s program has
enough strict convexity to yield unique optimal strategies for both the principal and the agents in a
sense made precise by Theorem 4.5. These optimal strategies represent a Stackelberg (rather than
a Nash) equilibrium, in the sense that no party has any incentive to change his or her strategies,
given that the principal must commit to and declare her strategy before the agents select theirs.
Of course, it is of practical interest that the principal be able to anticipate not only her optimal
price menu v : Y 7−→ R ∪ {+∞} — also known as the equilibrium prices — but the corresponding
distribution of goods which she will be called on to manufacture. This can be represented as a Borel
probability measure ν on Y , which we call the optimal production measure. It quantifies the relative
frequency of goods to be produced, and is the image of µ under the agents’ best response function
yb,v : X 7−→ Y to the principal’s optimal strategy v. This image ν = (yb,v)#µ is a Borel probability
measure on Y known as the push-forward of µ by yb,v, and is defined by the formula
(3.5) ν(W ) := µ[y−1b,v(W )]
for each W ⊂ Y . Theorem 4.5 asserts the optimal production measure ν is unique and the optimal
price menu v is uniquely determined ν-a.e.; the same theorem gives a sharp lower bound for v
throughout Y . If the convex domain Xy∅ is strictly convex and the density of agents is Lipschitz
continuous on X , Theorem 4.7 goes on to assert that these prices will be high enough to drive a
positive fraction of agents out of the market, extending Armstrong’s desirability of exclusion [3]
to a rich class of multidimensional models. Thus the goods to be manufactured and their prices
are uniquely determined at equilibrium, and the principal can price the goods she prefers not to
trade arbitrarily high but not arbitrarily low. Theorem 4.5 goes on to assert that the optimal
strategy yb,v(x) is also uniquely determined for µ-almost every agent x by b, c and µ, for each Borel
probability measure µ on X . Apart from Theorem 4.7, these conclusions apply to singular and
discrete measures as well as to continuous measures µ, assuming the tie-breaking conventions of
Remark 4.2 are adopted whenever µ fails to vanish on each Lipschitz hypersurface.
A number of examples of preference functions b(x, y) which satisfy our hypotheses are developed
in [19] [25] [26] [29] [30] [34] [36] [62]. Here we mention just three:
Example 3.3. For single dimensional type and allocation spaces n = 1, hypotheses (B1)–(B2)
are equivalent to asserting that the preference function b(x, y) be defined on a product of two
intervals where its cross-partial derivatives bxy do not vanish. Positive cross-curvature (B3u) asserts
that D2xyb in turn satisfies a Spence-Mirrlees condition, by having positive cross-partial derivatives:
D2xy(D
2
xyb) > 0.
Example 3.4. The bilinear preference function b(x, y) = x · y of Armstrong, Rochet and Chone´
satisfies (B0)–(B3) provided only that X,Y ⊂ Rn are convex bodies. In this case b- and b∗-
convexity coincide with ordinary convexity. Thus Theorem 4.5 asserts that any strictly convex
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manufacturing cost c(y) leads to unique optimal strategies for the principal and for µ-almost every
agent. This uniqueness is well-known for absolutely continuous measures dµ≪ dvol [50], and Carlier
and Lachand-Robert have extended Mussa and Rosen’s differentiability result u ∈ C1(X) to n ≥ 1 in
that case [15] [46], but the uniqueness of optimal strategies under the tie-breaking rules described in
Remark 4.2 may be new results when applied, for example, to discrete distributions µ concentrated
on finitely many agent types.
Example 3.5. Ma, Trudinger and Wang’s perturbation b(x, y) = x · y + F (x)G(y) of the bilinear
preference function is non-negatively cross-curved (B3) provided F ∈ C4
(
X
)
and G ∈ C4
(
Y
)
are
both convex [36] [25]; it is positively cross-curved if the convexity is strong, meaning both F (x)−ǫ|x|2
and G(y)−ǫ|y|2 remain convex for some ǫ > 0. It satisfies (B0)–(B1) provided supx∈X |DF (x)| < 1
and supy∈Y |DG(y)| < 1, and (B2) if the convex domains X and Y ⊂ R
n are sufficiently convex,
meaning all principal curvatures of these domains are sufficiently large at each boundary point [36].
On the other hand, b(x, y) = x·y+F (x)G(y) will violate (B3) ifD2F (x0) > 0 holds butD
2G(y0) ≥ 0
fails at some (x0, y0) ∈ X × Y .
In the next section we formulate the results mathematically. Let us first highlight one implication
of our results concerning robustness of the phenomena observed by Rochet and Chone´. Their
bilinear function b(x, y) = x · y lies on the boundary of the set of non-negatively cross-curved
preference functions, since its cross-curvature (2.1) vanishes identically. Our results show non-
negative cross-curvature (B3) to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal-agent
problem to be a convex program: the feasible set Vb
Y
becomes non-convex otherwise, and it is
reasonable to expect that uniqueness of the solution among other phenomena observed in [50] may
be violated in that case. In analogy with the discontinuities discovered by Loeper [33], we therefore
conjecture that the bundling discovered by Rochet and Chone´ is robust with respect to perturbations
of the bilinear preference function which respect (B0)–(B3), but not generally with respect to
perturbations violating (B3).
4. Mathematical formulation
Any price menu v : Y 7−→ R ∪ {∞} satisfies
(4.1) vb(x) + v(y)− b(x, y) ≥ 0
for all (y, x) ∈ Y × X, according to definition (3.1). Comparison with (3.2) makes it clear that a
(product, agent) pair produces equality in (4.1) if and only if selecting product y is among the best
responses of agent x to this menu; the set of such best-response pairs is denoted by ∂b
∗
v ⊂ Y ×X; see
also (A.2). We think of this relation as giving a multivalued correspondence between products and
agents: given price menu v the set of agents (if any) willing to select product y is denoted by ∂b
∗
v(y).
It turns out ∂b
∗
v(y) is non-empty for all y ∈ Y if and only if v is b∗-convex. Thus b∗-convexity of
v — or of c — means precisely that each product is priced low enough to be included among the
best responses of some agent or limiting agent type x ∈ X . As we shall see in Remark 4.2, assuming
b∗-convexity of v costs little or no generality; however, the b∗-convexity of c is a real restriction
— but plausible when the product types Y ⊂ Rn represent mixtures (weighted combinations of
pure products) which the principal could alternately choose to purchase separately and then bundle
together; this becomes natural in the context of von-Neumann and Morgenstern preference functions
[64] like the one used by Rochet and Chone´ [50].
Let DomDu ⊂ X denote the set where u is differentiable. If y is among the best responses of
agent x ∈ DomDvb to price menu v, the equality in (4.1) implies
(4.2) Dvb(x) = Dxb(x, y).
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In other words y = yb(x,Dv
b(x)), where yb is defined as follows:
Definition 4.1. For each x ∈ X and q ∈ Y x, let us define yb(x, q) to be the unique solution to
(4.3) Dxb(x, yb(x, q)) = q
guaranteed by (B1). The map yb (which is defined on a subset of the cotangent bundle T
∗X and
takes values in Y ) has also been called the b-exponential map [33], and denoted by yb(x, q) = b-Expxq.
The fact that the best response function takes the form y = yb(x,Dv
b(x)), and that DomDvb
exhaustsX except for a countable number of Lipschitz hypersurfaces, are among the key observations
exploited in [20] [31] following special cases worked out in [3] [8] [11] [21] [40] [50]. Indeed, vb is
well-known to be a b-convex function. It is therefore Lipschitz and semiconvex, satisfying the bounds
(4.4) |Dvb| ≤ ‖c‖
C1
(
X×Y
), D2vb ≥ −‖c‖
C2
(
X×Y
) inside X.
The second equation above holds in the distributional sense, and implies the differentiability of vb
outside a countable number of Lipschitz hypersurfaces.
Assuming µ assigns zero mass to each Lipschitz hypersurface (and so also to a countable number
of them), the results just summarized allow the principal’s problem (3.4) to be re-expressed in the
form min{L(u) | u ∈ U0}, where the principal’s net losses are given by
(4.5) L(u) :=
∫
X
[u(x) + c(yb(x,Du(x))) − b(x, yb(x,Du(x)))]dµ(x)
as is by now well-known [13]. Here U0 = {u ∈ V
b
Y
| u ≥ u∅} denotes the set of b-convex functions
on X dominating the reservation utility u∅(x) = b(x, y∅)−c(y∅), and the equality produced in (4.1)
by the response yb,v(x) = yb(x,Dv
b(x)) for µ-a.e. x has been exploited. Our hypothesis on the
distribution of agent types holds a fortiori whenever µ is absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure in coordinates on X . If no such hypothesis is satisfied, the reformulation (4.5) of
the principal’s net losses may not be well-defined, unless we extend the definition of Du(x) to all of
X by making a measurable selection from the relation
∂u(x) := {q ∈ Rn | u(z) ≥ u(x) + q · (z − x) + o(|z − x|) ∀ z ∈ X}
consistent with the following tie-breaking rule, analogous to one adopted, e.g., by Buttazzo and
Carlier in a different but related context [10]:
Remark 4.2. [Tie-breaking rules for singular measures] When an agent x remains indifferent between
two or more products, it is convenient to reduce the ambiguity in the definition of his best response
by insisting that yb,v(x) be chosen to maximize the principal’s profit v(y) − c(y), among those
products y which maximize (3.2). We retain the result yb,v(x) = yb(x,Dv
b(x)) by a corresponding
selection Dvb(x) ∈ ∂vb(x). This convention costs no generality when the distribution µ of agent
types vanishes on Lipschitz hypersurfaces in X , since u = vb is then differentiable µ-a.e.; in the
remaining cases it may be justified by assuming the principal has sufficient powers of persuasion to
sway an agent’s choice to her own advantage whenever some indifference would otherwise persist
between his preferred products [42]. After adopting this convention, it costs the principal none of her
profits to restrict her choice of strategies to b∗-convex price menus v = (vb)b
∗
, a second convention
we also choose to adopt whenever µ fails to vanish on each Lipschitz hypersurface.
The relevance of Theorem 3.2 to the principal-agent problem should now be clear: it guarantees
convexity of the feasible set U0 in (4.5). Our next proposition addresses the convexity properties
of the principal’s objective functional. Should convexity of this objective be strict, then the best
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response yb,v(x) selected by the tie-breaking rule above becomes unique — which it need not be
otherwise.
Proposition 4.3 (Convexity of the principal’s objective). If b ∈ C4
(
X × Y
)
satisfies (B0)–(B3)
and c : Y 7−→ R is b∗-convex, then for each x ∈ X, definition (4.3) makes a(q) := c(yb(x, q)) −
b(x, yb(x, q)) a convex function of q on the convex set Y x := Dxb(x, Y ) ⊂ R
n. The convexity of
a(q) is strict if either c is strictly b∗-convex — meaning the efficient allocation yb,c : X 7−→ Y is
continuous — or alternately if
(4.6) q ∈ Y x 7−→ b(x0, yb(x, q))− b(x, yb(x, q))
is a strictly convex function of q for each x, x0 ∈ X. If the preference function b is positively cross-
curved on X × Y , then convexity of a(q) is strong (meaning a(q) − ǫ|q|2/2 remains convex on Y x
for some ǫ > 0).
Strict convexity of (4.6) may subsequently be denoted by (B3s). As an immediate corollary to
Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 4.3, we have convexity of the principal’s optimization problem.
Corollary 4.4 (Convexity of the principal’s minimization). Let the distribution of agent types be
given by a Borel probability measure µ on X ⊂ Rn. Unless µ vanishes on all Lipschitz hypersurfaces,
adopt the tie-breaking conventions of Remark 4.2. If the preference b(x, y) of agent x ∈ X for product
y ∈ Y satisfies (B0)–(B3) and the principal’s manufacturing cost c : Y 7−→ R is b∗-convex, then
the principal’s problem (4.5) becomes a convex minimization over the convex set U0.
As a consequence, we obtain criteria guaranteeing uniqueness of the principal’s best strategy.
Theorem 4.5 (Criteria for uniqueness of optimal strategies). Assume the notation and hypotheses
of Corollary 4.4. Suppose, in addition, that the manufacturing cost c is strictly b∗-convex, or that the
preference function b is positively cross-curved (B3u), or that b satisfies (B3s), as in (4.6). Then
the equilibrium response of µ-almost every agent is uniquely determined, as is the optimal measure ν
from (3.5); (always assuming the tie-breaking conventions of Remark 4.2 to be in effect if µ does not
vanish on each Lipschitz hypersurface). Moreover, the principal has two optimal strategies u± ∈ U0
which coincide at least µ-almost everywhere, and sandwich all other optimal strategies u ∈ U0 between
them: u− ≤ u ≤ u+ on X. Finally, a lower semicontinuous v : Y 7−→ R ∪ {+∞} is an optimal
price menu if and only if v ≥ ub
∗
+ throughout Y , with equality holding ν-almost everywhere.
This theorem gives hypothesis which guarantee — even for discrete measures µ corresponding to
finitely many agent types — that the solution to the principal’s problem is unique in the sense that
optimality determines how many of each type of product the principal should manufacture, what
price she should charge for each of them, and which product will be selected by almost every agent.
A lower bound is specified on the price of each product which she does not wish to produce, to
ensure that it does not tempt any agent. When µ vanishes on Lipschitz hypersurfaces, this solution
represents the only Stackelberg equilibrium balancing the interests of the principal with those of
the agents; for more singular µ, it is possible that other Stackelberg equilibria exist, but if so they
violate the restrictions imposed on the behaviour of the principal and the agents in Remark 4.2.
The uniqueness theorem has as its corollary the following stability result concerning optimal
strategies. Recall that a sequence {µi}
∞
i=1 of Borel probability measures on a compact set X ⊂ R
n
is said to converge weakly-∗ to µ∞ if
(4.7)
∫
X
g(x)dµ∞(x) = lim
i→∞
∫
X
g(x)dµi(x)
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for each continuous test function g : X 7−→ R. This notion of convergence makes the Borel proba-
bility measures P
(
X
)
on X into a compact set, as a consequence of the Riesz-Markov and Banach-
Alaoglu theorems.
Corollary 4.6 (Stability of optimal strategies). For each i ∈ N∪{∞}, let the triple (bi, ci, µi) consist
of a preference function bi : X × Y 7−→ R, manufacturing cost ci : Y 7−→ R, and a distribution
of agent types µi on X satisfying the hypotheses of Theorem 4.5. Let ui : X 7−→ R denote a bi-
convex utility function minimizing the losses of a principal faced with data (bi, ci, µi). Suppose that
bi → b∞ in C
2
(
X × Y
)
, ci → c∞ uniformly on Y , and µi ⇀ µ∞ weakly-∗ as i → ∞. Assume
finally that µ∞ vanishes on all Lipschitz hypersurfaces. For µ∞-a.e. agent x ∈ X, the product
Gi(x) := ybi(x,Dui(x)) selected then converges to G∞(x). The optimal measures νi := (Gi)#µi
converge weakly-∗ to ν∞ as i → ∞. And the principal’s strategies converge uniformly in the sense
that limi→∞ ‖ui − u∞‖L∞(X,dµ∞) = 0.
Finally as evidence for the robustness of bunching phenomena displayed by our models, we show
the desirability of exclusion phenomenon found by Armstrong for preference functions b(x, y) =∑n
i=1 xibi(y) which are linear in x — or more generally homogeneous [3] — extends to the full range
of non-negatively cross-curved models. We assume strict convexity on the domainXy∅ := Dyb(X, y∅)
(see Remark 4.8), and that the distribution of agent types dµ(x) = f(x)dx has a Sobolev density
— denoted f ∈ W 1,1
(
X
)
and meaning both the function and its distributional derivative Df are
given by Lebesgue integrable densities. This is satisfied a fortiori if f is Lipschitz or continuously
differentiable (as Armstrong assumed). The exclusion phenomenon is of interest, since it confirms
that a positive fraction of customers must be excluded from participation at equilibrium, thus
ensuring elasticity of demand.
Theorem 4.7 (The desirability of exclusion). Let the distribution dµ(x) = f(x)dx of agent types
be given by a density f ∈ W 1,1 on X ⊂ Rn. Assume that the preference b(x, y) of agent x ∈ X for
product y ∈ Y satisfies (B0)–(B3) and the principal’s manufacturing cost c : Y 7−→ R is b∗-convex.
Suppose further that the convex domain Xy∅ = Dxb(X, y∅) has no n − 1 dimensional facets in its
boundary. Then any minimizer u ∈ U0 of the principal’s losses (4.5) coincides with the reservation
utility on a set U0 := {x ∈ X | u(x) = b(x, y∅) − c(y∅)} whose interior contains a positive fraction
of the agents. Such agents select the null product y∅.
Remark 4.8 (Facets and exclusion in different dimensions). A convex domain X ⊂ Rn fails to
be strictly convex if it has line segments in its boundary. These segments belong to facets of
dimension 1 or higher, up to n − 1 if the domain has a flat side (meaning a positive fraction of its
boundary coincides with a supporting hyperplane). Thus strict convexity of Xy∅ is sufficient for
the hypothesis of the preceding theorem to be satisfied — except in dimension n = 1. In a single
dimension, every convex domain X ⊂ R is an interval — hence strictly convex — whose endpoints
form zero-dimensional facets. Thus Theorem 4.7 is vacuous in dimension n = 1, which is consistent
with Armstrong’s observation the necessity of exclusion is a hallmark of higher dimensions n ≥ 2.
More recently, Deneckere and Severinov [16] have argued that necessity of exclusion is specific to the
case in which the dimensions m and n of agent and product types coincide. When (m,n) = (2, 1)
they give necessary and sufficient conditions for the desirability of exclusion, yielding a result quite
different from ours in that exclusion turns out to be more frequently the exception than the rule.
5. Discussion, extension, and conclusions
The role of private information in determining market value has a privileged place in economic
theory, acknowledged by the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences to Mirrlees
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and Vickrey in 1996, and to Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz in 2001. This phenomenon has been deeply
explored in the principal-agent framework, where a single seller (or single buyer) transacts business
with a collection of anonymous agents. In this context, the private (asymmetric) information takes
the form of a characteristic x ∈ X peculiar to each individual buyer which determines his preference
b(x, y) for different products y ∈ Y offered by the principal; x remains concealed from the principal
by anonymity of the buyer — at least until a purchase is made. Knowing only the preference function
b(x, y), the statistical distribution dµ(x) of buyer types, and her own manufacturing costs c(y), the
principal’s goal is to fix a price menu for different products which maximizes her profits.
Many studies involving finite spaces of agent and product types X and Y have been carried out,
including Spence’s initial work on labour market signalling [58] and Stiglitz paper with Rothschild
on insurance [54]. However for a principal who transacts business with a one-dimensional continuum
of agents X ⊂ R, the problem was solved in Mirrlees’ celebrated work on optimal taxation [42], and
in Spence’s study [59], assuming the contract types y ∈ Y ⊂ R are also parameterized by a single
real variable. (For Mirrlees, y ∈ R represented the amount of labour an individual chooses to do
facing a given tax schedule, while for Spence it represented the amount of education he chooses to
acquire facing a given range of employment possibilities, x ∈ R being his intrinsic ability in both
cases). In the context of nonlinear pricing discussed above, the one-dimensional model was studied
by Mussa and Rosen [46]. The challenge of resolving the multidimensional version X,Y ⊂ Rn of this
archetypal problem in microeconomic theory has been highlighted by many authors [39] [65] [44] [51]
[7]. When only one side of the market displays multidimensional types, analyses have been carried out
by Mirman and Sibley [41], Roberts [47] and Spence [60], who allow multidimensional products, and
by Laffont, Maskin and Rochet [27], Araujo, Gottlieb and Moreira [2], and Deneckere and Severinov
[16] who model two-dimensional agents choosing from a one-dimensional product line. When both
sides of the market display multidimensional types, existence of an equilibrium has been established
by Monteiro and Page [45] and by Carlier [13], who employed a variational formulation; see also the
control-theoretic approach of Basov [6] [7]. However, non-convexities have rendered the behaviour of
this optimization problem largely intractable [24] — unless the preference function b(x, y) = x·G(y) is
assumed to depend linearly on agent type [66] [3] [50]. Moreover, the presence of convexity typically
depends on a correct choice of coordinates, so is not always easy to discern. The present study treats
general Borel probability measures µ on X ⊂ Rn, and provides a unified framework for dealing with
discrete and continuous type spaces, by invoking the tie-breaking rules of Remark 4.2 in case µ is
discrete. Assuming b∗-convexity of c, we consider preferences linear in price (3.2) (sometimes called
quasilinear), which satisfy a generalized Spence-Mirrlees single crossing condition (B0)-(B1) and
appropriate convexity conditions on its domain (B2), and we identify a criterion (B3) equivalent to
convexity of the principal’s optimization problem (Theorem 3.2). This criterion is a strengthening of
Ma, Trudinger and Wang’s necessary [33] and sufficient [36] [62] condition for continuity of optimal
mappings. Like all of our hypotheses, it is independent of the choice of parameterization of agent
and/or product types — as emphasized in [25]. We believe the resulting convexity is a fundamental
property which will eventually enable a more complete theoretical and computational analysis of the
multidimensional principal-agent problem, and we indicate some examples of preference functions
which satisfy it in Examples 3.3–3.5; the bilinear example b(x, y) = x ·y of Rochet and Chone´ lies on
the boundary of such preference functions. If either the cross-curvature inequality (B3) holds strictly
or the b∗-convexity of c(y) is strict — meaning the efficient solution yb,c(x) depends continuously
on x ∈ X — we go on to derive uniqueness and stability of optimal strategies (Theorem 4.5 and its
corollary). Under mild additional hypotheses we confirm that a positive fraction of agents must be
priced out of the market when the type spaces are multidimensional (Theorem 4.7). We conjecture
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that non-negative cross-curvature (B3) is likely to be necessary and sufficient for robustness of
Armstrong’s desirability of exclusion [3] and the other bunching phenomena observed by Rochet
and Chone´ [50].
Remark 5.1 (Maximizing social welfare under profitability constraints). Before concluding this pa-
per, let us briefly mention an important class of related models to which the same considerations
apply: namely, the problem of maximizing the expected welfare of the agents under a profitability
constraint on the principal. Such a model has been used by Roberts [47] to study energy pricing by
a public utility, and explored by Spence [60] and Monteiro and Page [45] in other contexts. Suppose
the welfare of agent x ∈ X is given by a concave function w(u(x)) of his indirect utility (3.2). Intro-
ducing a Lagrange multiplier λ for the profitability constraint L(u) ≤ 0, the problem of maximizing
the net social welfare over all agents becomes equivalent to the maximization
W (λ) := max
u∈U0
−λL(u) +
∫
X
w(u(x))dµ(x)
for some choice of λ ≥ 0. Assuming (B0)–(B3), and b∗-convexity of c, for each λ ≥ 0 this amounts
to a concave maximization on a convex set, as a consequence of Theorem 3.2, Proposition 4.3 and
the concavity of w. Theorem 4.5 and its corollary give hypotheses which guarantee uniqueness and
stability of its solution uλ; if the concavity of w is strict, we obtain uniqueness µ-a.e. of uλ more
directly under the weaker hypotheses of Corollary 4.4. Either way, once the uniqueness of uλ has
been established, standard arguments in the calculus of variations show the convex function W (λ)
to be continuously differentiable, and that each value of its derivative W ′(λ) = −L(uλ) corresponds
to a possibly degenerate interval λ ∈ [λ1, λ2] on which uλ is constant; see e.g. Corollary 2.11 of [12].
Uniqueness of a social welfare maximizing strategy subject to any budget constraint in the range
]L(u0), L(u∞)[ is therefore established; this range contains the vanishing budget constraint as long
as L(u0) > 0 > L(u∞); here u0 represents the unconstrained maximizer whereas u∞ ∈ U0 minimizes
the principal’s losses (4.5). All of our results — except for the desirability of exclusion (Theorem
4.7) — extend immediately to this new setting. This sole exception is in accord with the intuition
that it need not be necessary to exclude any potential buyers if one aims to maximize social welfare
instead of the monopolist’s profits.
6. Proofs
Let us recall a characterization of non-negative cross-curvature from Theorem 2.11 of [26], inspired
by Loeper’s characterization [33] of (A3w). We recall its proof partly for the sake of completeness,
but also to extract a criterion for strong convexity.
Lemma 6.1 (Characterizing non-negative cross-curvature [26]). A preference function b satisfying
(B0)–(B2) is non-negatively cross-curved (B3) if and only if for each x, x1 ∈ X
(6.1) q ∈ Y x 7−→ b(x1, yb(x, q))− b(x, yb(x, q))
is a convex function. If the preference function is positively cross-curved, then (6.1) will be strongly
convex (meaning its Hessian will be positive definite).
Proof. Fix x, x1 ∈ X and set qt := (1 − t)q0 + tq1 and f(·, t) := b(·, yb(x, qt)) − b(x, yb(x, qt)) for
t ∈ [0, 1]. Given t0 ∈ [0, 1], use (B1)–(B2) to define the curve s ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ xs ∈ X for which
(6.2) Dxb(xs, yt0) = (1− s)Dxb(x, yt0) + sDxb(x1, yt0),
and set g(s) = ∂
2f
∂t2 (xs, t0). The convexity of (6.1) will be verified by checking g(1) ≥ 0. Let us
start by observing s ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ g(s) is a convex function, as a consequence of property (B3) and
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(6.2); (according to Lemma 4.5 of [25], inequality (2.1) follows from (B3) whenever either of the
two curves s ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ (Dyb(x(s), y(0)) or s ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ Dxb(x(0), y(s))) is a line segment). We
next claim g(s) is minimized at s = 0, since
g′(s) =
∂2
∂t2
∣∣∣∣
t=t0
〈Dxb(xs, yb(x0, (1− t)q0 + tq1)), x˙s〉
vanishes at s = 0, by the definition (4.3) of yb. Thus g(1) ≥ g(0) = 0, establishing the convexity of
(6.1). If b is positively cross-curved, then g′′(s) > 0 and the desired strong convexity follows from
g(1) > g(0) = 0.
Conversely, if the convexity of (6.1) fails we can find x1 ∈ X and s0, t0 ∈ [0, 1] for which the
construction above yields g′′(s0) < 0. In view of Lemma 4.5 of [25], this provides a contradiction to
(2.1). 
We shall also need to recall two basic facts about b-convex functions from e.g. [21]: any supremum
of b-convex functions is again b-convex, unless it is identically infinite; and for each y ∈ Y and λ ∈ R,
the function
(6.3) x ∈ X 7−→ b(x, y)− λ
is b-convex. Functions of the form either y ∈ Y 7−→ b(x, y) − λ or (6.3) are sometimes called
mountains below.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. The b∗-convexity of the manufacturing cost c = (cb)b
∗
asserts
c(y) = sup
x∈X
b(x, y)− cb(x)
is a supremum of mountains, whence
a(q) := c(yb(x, q)) − b(x, yb(x, q)) = sup
x0∈X
b(x0, yb(x, q)) − b(x, yb(x, q)) − c
b(x0)
for all x ∈ X and q ∈ Y x. According to Lemma 6.1, we have just expressed a(q) as a supremum
of convex functions, thus establishing convexity of a(q). The functions under the supremum are
strictly convex if (4.6) holds, and strongly convex if b is positively cross-curved, thus establishing
the strict or strong convexity of a(q) under the respective hypotheses (B3s) and (B3u).
The remainder of the proof will be devoted to deducing strict convexity of a(q) from strict b∗-
convexity of c(y) assuming only (B3). Recall that strict b∗-convexity was defined by continuity of the
agents’ responses yb,c : X 7−→ Y to the principal’s manufacturing costs (as opposed to the prices the
principal would prefer to select). Fix x ∈ X and use the C3 change of variables q ∈ Y x 7−→ yb(x, q) ∈
Y to define b˜(·, q) := b(·, yb(x, q))− b(x, yb(x, q)) and c˜(q) := c(yb(x, q))− b(x, yb(x, q)) = a(q). As in
[18], it is easy to deduce that b˜ satisfies the same hypotheses (B0)–(B3) on X × Y x as the original
preference function — except for the fact that b˜ ∈ C3 whereas b ∈ C4. For the reasons explained
in [18] this discrepancy shall not trouble us here: we still have continuous fourth derivatives of b˜
as long as at least one of the four derivatives is with respect to a variable in X, and at most three
derivatives are with respect to variables in Y x. Note also that c˜
b˜ = cb and the continuity of the
agents’ responses yb˜,c˜ in the new variables follows from their presumed continuity in the original
variables, since yb˜,c˜(·) = Dxc(x, yb,c(·)).
The advantage of the new variables is that for each x0 ∈ X, the mountain q ∈ Y x 7−→ b˜(x0, q)
is a convex function, according to Lemma 6.1; (alternately, Theorem 4.3 of [18]). To produce a
contradiction, assume convexity of c˜(q) fails to be strict, so there is a segment t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ qt ∈ Y x
given by qt = (1 − t)q0 + tq1 along which c˜ is affine with the same slope p ∈ ∂c˜(qt) for each
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t ∈ [0, 1]. In fact, the compact convex set ∂c˜(qt) is independent of t ∈]0, 1[, so taking p to be an
extreme point of ∂c˜(qt) allows us to find a sequence qt,k ∈ Yx ∩DomDc˜ converging to qt such that
p = limk→∞Dc˜(qt,k), by Theorem 25.6 of Rockafellar [53]. On the other hand, b
∗-convexity implies
c˜(q) is a supremum of mountains: thus to each t ∈ [0, 1] and integer k corresponds some xt,k ∈ X
such that (xt,k, qt,k) ∈ ∂
b˜∗ c˜, meaning
(6.4) c˜(q) ≥ b˜(xt,k, q)− b˜(xt,k, qt,k) + c˜(qt,k)
for all q ∈ Y x. Since qt,k ∈ DomDc˜, saturation of this bound at qt,k impliesDc˜(qt,k) = Dq b˜(xt,k, qt,k).
Compactness of X allows us to extract a subsequential limit (xt,k, qt,k) → (xt, qt) ∈ ∂
b˜∗ c˜ satisfying
p = Dq b˜(xt, qt). This first order condition shows the curve t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ xt ∈ X to be differentiable,
with derivative
(6.5) x˙t = −D
2
qxb˜(xt, qt)
−1D2qq b˜(xt, qt)q˙t,
by the implicit function theorem and (B1). On the other hand, both c˜(·) and b˜(xt, ·) are convex
functions of q ∈ Y x in (6.4), so both must be affine along the segment qt. This implies q˙t = q1− q0 is
a zero eigenvector of D2qq b˜(xt, qt), which in turn implies xt = const from (6.5). On the other hand,
the efficient response qt = yb˜,c˜(xt) of agent xt to price menu c˜ is not constant, since the endpoints
q0 6= q1 of the segment are distinct. This produces the desired contradiction and establishes strict
convexity of c˜. 
Combining Proposition 4.3 with the following standard lemma will allow us to establish our
necessary and sufficient criteria for convexity of the feasible set U0.
Lemma 6.2 (Identification of supporting mountains). Let u be a b-convex function on X. Assume
u is differentiable at x0 ∈ X and Dxu(x0) = Dxb(x0, y) for some y ∈ Y . Then, u(x) ≥ m(x) for all
x ∈ X, where m(·) = b(·, y)− b(x0, y) + u(x0).
Proof. By b-convexity of u, there exists y0 ∈ Y such that u(x0) = b(x0, y0)− u
b¯(y0) and also u(x) ≥
b(x, y0)−u
b¯(y0) for all x ∈ X . Since u is differentiable at x0, this implies Dxu(x0) = Dxb(x0, y0). By
the assumption (B1), we conclude y = y0. This completes the proof sincem(·) = b(·, y0)−u
b¯(y0). 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let us first show the sufficiency. It is enough to show that for any two b-
convex functions u0 and u1, the linear combination ut := (1− t)u0 + tu1 is again b-convex, for each
0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Fix x0 ∈ X. Since b-convex functions are defined as suprema of mountains, there exist
y0, y1 ∈ Y such that
mx0i (·) := b(·, yi)− b(x0, yi), i = 0, 1,
satisfy ui(x) ≥ m
x0
i (x) + ui(x0) for all x ∈ X. Clearly equality holds when x = x0. Let us consider
the function
mx0t (·) = b(·, yt)− b(x0, yt),
where yt defines a line segment
t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ Dxb(x0, yt) = (1− t)Dxb(x0, y0) + tDxb(x0, y1) ∈ R
n.
Note that (i) mx0t (x0) = 0. We claim that (ii) ut(·) ≥ m
x0
t (·) + ut(x0). Notice that
ut(·) ≥ (1− t)m
x0
0 (·) + tm
x0
1 (·) + ut(x0).
Thus the claim follows from the inequality (1 − t)mx00 + tm
x0
1 ≥ m
x0
t , which is implied by (B3)
according to Lemma 6.1. The last two properties (i) and (ii) enable one to express ut as a supremum
of mountains
ut(·) = sup
x0∈X
mx0t (·) + ut(x0),
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hence ut is b-convex by the remark immediately preceding (6.3).
Conversely, let us show the necessity of (B3) for convexity of Vb
Y
. Using the same notation
as above, recall that each mountain mx0i , i = 0, 1 is b-convex. Assume the linear combination
ht := (1−t)m
x0
0 +tm
x0
1 is b-convex. SinceDxh(x0) = (1−t)Dxb(x0, y0)+tDxb(x0, y1)) = Dxmt(x0),
Lemma 6.2 requires thatmx0t ≤ ht for every 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. This last condition is equivalent the property
characterizing nonnegative cross-curvature in Lemma 6.1. This completes the proof of necessity and
the proof of the theorem. 
Let us turn now to the convexity of the principal’s problem.
Proof of Corollary 4.4. Corollary 4.4 follows by combining the convexity of the set U0 of feasible
strategies proved in Theorem 3.2 with the convexity of a(q) from Proposition 4.3. If µ fails to
vanish on each Lipschitz hypersurface, a little care is needed to deduce convexity of the principal’s
objective L(u) from that of a(q), by invoking the conventions adopted in Remark 4.2 as follows. Let
t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ ut = (1− t)u0+ tu1 denote a line segment in the convex set U0. If q ∈ ∂ut(x) for some
x ∈ X , then yb(x, q) ∈ ∂
but(x) by Theorem 3.1 of Loeper [33]; (a direct proof along the lines of
Lemma 6.1 may be found in [25]). So yb(x, q) is among the best responses of x to price menu vt = u
b∗
t .
For each t ∈ [0, 1] select Dut(x) ∈ ∂ut(x) measurably to ensure min{c(yb(x, q)) − b(x, yb(x, q)) |
q ∈ ∂ut(x)} is achieved at q = Dut(x). Then a(Dut(x)) ≤ a((1 − t)Du0(x) + tDu1(x)) since
(1− t)Du0(x) + tDu1(x) ∈ ∂ut(x). The desired convexity of L(u) follows. 
Next we establish uniqueness of the principal’s strategy.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Suppose both u0 and u1 minimize the principal’s net losses L(u) on the
convex set U0. Define the line segment ut = (1 − t)u0 + tu1 and — in case µ fails to vanish
on each Lipschitz hypersurface — the measurable selection Dut(x) ∈ ∂ut(x) as in the proof of
Corollary 4.4. The strict convexity of a(q) asserted by Proposition 4.3 removes all freedom from this
selection. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 4.5, the same strict convexity implies the contradiction
L(u1/2) <
1
2L(u0)+
1
2L(u1) = L(u1) unless Du0 = Du1 holds µ-a.e. This establishes the uniqueness
µ-a.e. of the agents’ equilibrium strategies yb,v(x) := yb(x,Du1(x)), and of the principal’s optimal
measure ν := (yb,v)#µ in (3.5).
Let sptµ denote the smallest closed subset of X containing the full mass of µ. To identify
u0 = u1 on sptµ and establish the remaining assertions is more technical. First observe that the
participation constraint u1/2(x) ≥ b(x, y∅) − c(y∅) =: u∅(x) on the continuous function u1/2 ∈ U0
must bind for some agent type x0 ∈ sptµ; otherwise for ǫ > 0 sufficiently small, max{u1/2 − ǫ, u∅}
would belong to U0 and reduce the principal’s losses by ǫ, contradicting the asserted optimality of
u1/2. Since u1/2 is a convex combination of two other functions obeying the same constraint, we
conclude u0(x0) = u1(x0) coincides with the reservation utility u∅(x0) for type x0. Now use the map
yb,v := yb ◦Du1 from the first paragraph of the proof to define a joint measure γ := (id × yb,v)#µ
given by γ[U × V ] = µ[U × y−1b,v (V )] for Borel U × V ⊂ X × Y , and denote by spt γ the smallest
closed subset S ⊂ X × Y carrying the full mass of γ. Notice spt γ does not depend on t ∈ [0, 1], nor
in fact on u0 or u1; any other optimal strategy for the principal would lead to the same γ.
Since the graph of yb,v lies in the closed set ∂
bu1 ⊂ X×Y , the same is true of S := {(x0, y∅)}∪spt γ.
Thus S is b-cyclically monotone (A.1) by the result of Rochet [49] discussed immediately before
Lemma A.1. Lemma A.1 then yields a minimal b-convex function u− satisfying u−(x0) = b(x0, y∅)−
c(y∅) for which S ⊂ ∂
bu−. The fact that (x0, y∅) ∈ S implies some mountain b(·, y∅) + λ bounds
u−(·) from below with contact at x0. Clearly λ = −c(y∅) whence u− ∈ U0.
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Now we have ui ≥ u− for i = 0, 1 with equality at x0. Also, yb,v(x) ∈ ∂
bu−(x) for µ almost all
x, whence u− must be an optimal strategy: it is smaller in value than ui and produces at least as
favorable a response as ui from almost all agents. Finally since
L(ui)− L(u−) ≥
∫
X
(ui(x)− u−(x))dµ(x) ≥ 0,
the fact that ui minimizes the losses of the principal implies the continuous integrand vanishes
µ-almost everywhere. Thus ui ≥ u− on X , with equality holding throughout sptµ as desired.
Since u0 was arbitrary, we have now proved that all optimal u ∈ U0 coincide with u1 on sptµ.
Optimality of u also implies spt γ ⊂ ∂bu; if in addition the participation constraint u(x) ≥ b(x, y∅)−
c(y∅) binds at x0, then u ≥ u− on X. Although u− appears to depend on our choice of x0 ∈ sptµ
in the construction above this is not actually the case: u(x0) = u1(x0) shows the participation
constraint binds at x0 for every optimal strategy and u− is therefore uniquely determined by its
minimality among optimal strategies u ∈ U0.
Now, since any supremum of b-convex functions (not identically infinite) is again b-convex, define
u+ ∈ U0 as the pointwise supremum among all of the principal’s equilibrium strategies u ∈ U0. The
foregoing shows u+ = u− on sptµ, while (x, y) ∈ spt γ ⊂ ∂
bu implies
u+(·) ≥ u(·) ≥ u(x) + b(·, y)− b(x, y)
= u+(x) + b(·, y)− b(x, y)
on X, whence spt γ ⊂ ∂bu+. From here we deduce L(u+) ≤ L(u), hence u+ is itself an optimal
strategy for the principal.
Finally, v : Y 7−→ R ∪ {+∞} is an equilibrium price menu in Carlier’s reformulation [13] if
and only if u := vb minimizes L(u) on U0, in which case u− ≤ u ≤ u+ throughout X implies
ub
∗
+ ≤ (v
b)b
∗
≤ ub
∗
− throughout Y . Moreover, u− = u+ on sptµ implies u
b∗
+ = u
b∗
− on spt ν, since
yb,v(x) ∈ ∂
bu±(x) for µ-a.e. x implies u
b∗
± (yb,v(x)) = b(x, yb,v(x)) − u±(x). We therefore conclude
that if v is an equilibrium price menu, then v ≥ (vb)b
∗
≥ ub
∗
+ on Y , with both equalities holding
ν-a.e. Conversely, if v : Y 7−→ R ∪ {+∞} satisfies v ≥ ub
∗
+ with equality ν-a.e., we deduce the same
must be true for its b-convex hull (vb)b
∗
, the latter being the largest b-convex function dominated
by v. Thus (vb)b
∗
(y∅) = c(y∅) and v
b ∈ U0 and v
b ≤ u+ throughout X with equality holding µ-a.e.
If µ vanishes on Lipschitz hypersurfaces, then Dvb = Du+ agree µ-a.e., so L(vb) = L(u+) and
vb is a optimal strategy for the principal as desired. If, on the other hand, µ does not vanish on
all Lipschitz hypersurfaces, then we may assume v is its own b∗-convex hull by Remark 4.2. Any
mountain which touches ub
∗
+ from below on spt ν also touches v ≥ u
b∗
+ from below at the same
point, thus ∂b
∗
ub
∗
+ ⊂ ∂
b∗v; since v is b-convex this is equivalent to ∂bu+ ⊂ ∂
bvb. This shows the
best response of x facing price menu ub
∗
+ is also one of his best responses facing price menu v: he
cannot have a better response since his indirect utility vb ≤ u+. The constraint on the agent’s
behaviour imposed by Remark 4.2 now implies L(vb) ≤ L(u+); equality must hold since u+ is one
of the principal’s optimal strategies. This confirms optimality of vb and concludes the proof of the
theorem. 
To show stability of the equilibrium requires the following convergence result concerning Borel
probability measures P
(
X × Y
)
on the product space.
Proposition 6.3 (Convergence of losses and mixed strategies). Suppose a sequence of triples
(b∞, c∞, µ∞) = limi→∞(bi, ci, µi) satisfy the hypotheses of Corollary 4.6. Let Li(u) denote the net
losses (4.5) by a principal who adopts strategy u facing data (bi, ci, µi). If any sequence ui of bi-convex
functions converge uniformly on X, then their limit u∞ is b∞-convex and L∞(u∞) = limi→∞ Li(ui).
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Furthermore, there is a unique joint measure γ∞ ∈ P
(
X × Y
)
supported in ∂b∞u∞ with left mar-
ginal µ∞, and any sequence of joint measures γi ∈ P
(
X × Y
)
vanishing outside ∂biui and with left
marginal µi, must converge weakly-∗ to γ∞.
Proof. Assume a sequence ui → u∞ of bi-convex functions converges uniformly on X. Topologizing
the continuous functions C
(
Z
)
by uniform convergence, where Z = X,Y or X × Y , makes the
transformation (b, u) 7−→ ub
∗
given by (3.1) continuous on C
(
X × Y
)
× C
(
X
)
. This fact allows
us to take i → ∞ in the relation u
b∗i bi
i = ui to conclude b∞-convexity of u∞. From the semi-
convexity (4.4) of u∞ we infer its domain of differentiability DomDu∞ exhausts X apart from
a countable collection of Lipschitz hypersurfaces, which are µ∞-negligible by hypothesis. Define
the map G∞(x) = yb∞(x,Du∞(x)) on DomDu∞. Since ∂
b∞u∞ ∩ (DomDu∞ × Y ) coincides with
the graph of G∞, any measure γ∞ supported in ∂
b∞u∞ with left marginal µ∞ is given (6.6) by
γ∞ := (id×G∞)#µ∞ as in, e.g., Lemma 2.1 of Ahmad et al [1]. This specifies γ∞ uniquely.
Now suppose γi ≥ 0 is a sequence of measures supported in ∂
biui having left marginal µi. Com-
pactness allows us to extract from any subsequence of γi a further subsequence which converges
weakly-∗ to some limit γ¯ ∈ P
(
X × Y
)
. Since µi ⇀ µ∞ the left marginal of γ¯ is given by µ∞. More-
over, since ui(x) + u
b∗i
i (y) ≥ bi(x, y) throughout X × Y with equality on spt γi, uniform convergence
of this expression yields spt γ¯ ⊂ ∂b∞u∞. The uniqueness result of the preceding paragraph then
asserts γ¯ = γ∞ independently of the choice of subsequence, so the full sequence γi ⇀ γ∞ converges
weakly-∗.
Finally, use the measurable selection Dui(x) ∈ ∂ui(x) of Remark 4.2 to extend Dui(x) from
DomDui to X so as to guarantee that Gi(x) := ybi(x,Dui(x))) ∈ ∂
biui(x). Use the Borel map
Gi : X 7−→ Y to push µi forward to the joint probability measure γi := (id × Gi)#µi on X × Y
defined by
(6.6) γi[U × V ] := µi[U ∩G
−1
i (V )]
for each Borel U × V ⊂ X × Y . Notice γi is supported in ∂
biui and has µi for its left marginal,
hence converges weakly-∗ to γ∞. Moreover, our choice of measurable selection guarantees that the
net losses (4.5) of the principal choosing strategy ui coincide with
(6.7) Li(ui) =
∫
X×Y
(ci(y)− u
b∗i
i (y))dγi(x, y).
Weak-∗ convergence of the measures γi ⇀ γ∞ couples with uniform convergence of the integrands
to yield the desired limit
lim
i→∞
Li(ui) =
∫
X×Y
(c∞(y)− u
b∗∞
∞ (y))dγ∞(x, y) = L∞(u∞)
and establish the proposition. 
Proof of Corollary 4.6. Let U i0 denote the space of bi-convex functions u(·) ≥ bi(·, y∅) − ci(y∅), and
Li(u) denote the net loss of the principal who chooses strategy u facing the triple (bi, ci, µi). The
Li-minimizing strategies ui ∈ U
i
0 are Lipschitz and semiconvex, with upper bounds (4.4) on |Dui|
and −D2ui which are independent of i since ‖bi− b∞‖C2 → 0. The Ascoli-Arzela` theorem therefore
yields a subsequence ui(j) which converges uniformly to a limit u¯ on the compact set X. Since
the functions ui have a semiconvexity constant independent of i, it is a well-known corollary that
their gradients also converge Dui(j)(x) → Du¯(x) pointwise on the set of common differentiability
(DomDu¯)∩(∩∞i=1 DomDui). This set exhausts X up to a countable union of Lipschitz hypersurfaces
— which is µ∞-negligible by hypothesis. Setting Gi(x) = ybi(x,Dui(x)), it is not hard to deduce
yb∞(x,Du¯(x)) = limj→∞Gi(j)(x) on this set from Definition 4.1. If we can now prove u¯ minimizes
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L∞(u) on U
∞
0 , the uniqueness of equilibrium product selected by µ∞-a.e. agent x ∈ X in Theorem 4.5
will then imply that limj→∞Gi(j)(x) = G∞(x) converges to a limit independent of the subsequence
chosen, hence the full sequence Gi(x) converges µ∞-a.e.
To see that u¯ minimizes L∞(u) on U
∞
0 , observe u ∈ U
∞
0 implies u
b∗∞bi ∈ U i0 is Li-feasible,
being the bi-transform of a price menu u
b∗∞(·) agreeing with c∞(·) at y∅. Moreover, u
b∗∞bi → ub
∗
∞b∞
uniformly as i→∞ (by continuity of the b-transform asserted in the first paragraph of the preceding
proof). The optimality of ui therefore yields Li(ui) ≤ Li(u
b∗∞bi). Proposition 6.3 allows us to
deduce L∞(u¯) ≤ L∞(u) by taking the subsequential limit j → ∞. Since the same proposition
asserts b∞-convexity of u¯, we find u¯ ∈ U
∞
0 is the desired minimizer after taking the limit j → ∞
in ui(j)(·) ≥ bi(j)(·, y∅) − ci(j)(y∅). This concludes the proof of µ∞-a.e. convergence of the maps
G∞(x) = limi→∞Gi(x).
Turning to the optimal measures: as in the preceding proof, a measurable selection Dui(x) ∈
∂ui(x) consistent with the tie-breaking hypotheses of Remark 4.2 may be used to extend the Borel
map Gi(x) = yb(x,Dui(x)) from DomDui to X and define a joint measure γi := (id × Gi)#µi
supported on ∂biui as in (6.6). The left marginal of γi is obviously given by µi, and its right
marginal coincides with the unique optimal measure νi given by Theorem 4.5. Proposition 6.3 then
yields weak-∗ convergence of γi ⇀ γ∞ and hence of νi ⇀ ν∞. Theorem 4.5 also asserts the two
minimizers u∞ = u¯ agree µ∞-a.e. In this case the uniform limit u¯ is independent of the Ascoli-Arzela`
subsequence, hence we recover convergence of the full sequence ui → u∞ in L
∞(X, dµ∞) . 
Finally, let us extend Armstrong’s desirability of exclusion to our model. Our proof is inspired
by Armstrong’s [3], but differs from his in a number of ways.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Use the C3-smooth diffeomorphism x ∈ X 7−→ p = Dyb(x, y∅) ∈ Xy∅ pro-
vided by (B0)–(B2) and its inverse p ∈ Xy∅ 7−→ x = xb(y∅, p) ∈ X to reparameterize the space of
agents over the strictly convex set Xy∅ . Then u˜(p) := u(xb(y∅, p)) − b(xb(y∅, p), y∅) + c(y∅) defines
a non-negative b˜-convex function, where b˜(p, y) := b(xb(y∅, p), y) − b(xb(y∅, p), y∅) + c(y∅). In other
words, the space U0 corresponds to the space U˜0 of non-negative b˜-convex functions on Xy∅ in the
new parameterization. This subtraction of the reservation utility from the preference function does
not change any agent’s response to a price menu v offered by the principal, since preferences between
different agent types are never compared. However, it does make the preference function b˜(p, y) a
convex function of p ∈ Xy∅ , as is easily seen by interchanging the roles of x and y in Lemma 6.1.
The indirect utility u˜(p) = vb˜(p) is then also convex, being a supremum (3.1) of such preference
functions.
In the new variables, the distribution of agents f˜(p)dp = f(x)dx is given by f˜(p) = f(xb(y∅, p)) det[∂x
i
b(y∅, p)/∂pj].
The principal’s net losses L˜(u˜) = L(u) are given as in (4.5) by
L˜(u˜) =
∫
Xy∅
a˜(Du˜(p), u˜(p), p)f˜(p)dp,
where a˜(q, s, p) = c(yb˜(p, q)) − b˜(p, yb˜(p, q)) + s is a convex function of q on Y˜p := Dpb˜(p, Y ) for
each fixed p and s, according to Proposition 4.3; (recall that b˜ ∈ C3
(
Xy∅ × Y
)
satisfies the same
hypotheses (B0)–(B3) as b ∈ C4
(
X×Y
)
, except for the possibitity that four continuous derivatives
with respect to variables in Xy∅ fail to exist, which is irrelevant as already discussed). This convexity
implies
a˜(q, s, p) ≥ a˜(q0, s, p) + 〈Dq a˜(q0, s, p), q − q0〉
for all q, q0 ∈ Y˜ p. With p still fixed, the choice q0 = Dpb˜(p, y∅) = 0 shows a˜(0, s, p) = s whence
a˜(q, s, p) ≥ 〈Dqa˜(0, s, p), q〉 for s = u˜(x) ≥ 0.
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Now suppose u˜ ∈ U˜0 minimizes L˜(u˜). For ǫ ≥ 0, define the continuously increasing family of
compact convex sets U˜ǫ := {p ∈ Xy∅ | u˜(p) ≤ ǫ}. Observe that U˜0 must be non-empty, since
otherwise for ǫ > 0 small enough U˜ǫ would be empty, and then u˜ − ǫ ∈ U˜0 is a better strategy,
reducing the principal’s losses by ǫ. We now claim the interior of the set U˜0 — which corresponds to
agents who decline to participate — contains a non-zero fraction of the total population of agents.
Our argument is inspired by the strategy Armstrong worked out in a special case [3], which was to
show that unless this conclusion is true, the profit the principal extracts from agents in U˜ǫ would
vanish at a higher order than ǫ > 0, making u˜ǫ := max{u˜ − ǫ, 0} ∈ U˜0 a better strategy than u˜ for
the principal when ǫ is sufficiently small.
For ǫ > 0, the contribution of U˜ǫ to the principal’s profit is given by
−L˜ǫ(u˜) := −
∫
U˜ǫ
a˜(Du˜(p), u˜(p), p)f˜(p)dp
≤ −
∫
U˜ǫ
〈Dq a˜(0, u˜(p), p), Du˜(p)〉f˜(p)dp
=
∫
U˜ǫ
u˜(p)∇p · (f˜(p)Dqa˜(0, u˜(p), p))dp−
∫
∂U˜ǫ
u˜(p)〈Dq a˜, nˆ〉f˜(p)dS(p)(6.8)
where nˆ = nˆU˜ǫ(p) denotes the outer until normal to U˜ǫ at p, and the divergence theorem has been
used. Here ∂U˜ǫ denotes the boundary of the convex set U˜ǫ, and dS(p) denotes the n− 1 dimensional
surface (i.e. Hausdorff) measure on this boundary. (For Sobolev functions, the integration by parts
formula that we need is contained in §4.3 of [17] under the additional restriction that the vector field
u˜(·)Dqa(0, u˜(·), ·) be C
1 smooth, but extends immediately to Lipschitz vectors fields by approxima-
tion; the operation of restricting f˜ to the boundary of U˜ǫ is there shown to give a bounded linear
map fromW 1,1(Uǫ, dp) to L
1(∂Uǫ, dS) called the boundary trace.) As ǫ→ 0, we claim both integrals
in (6.8) vanish at rate o(ǫ) if the interior of U˜0 is empty. To see this, note u˜ = ǫ on ∂U˜ǫ ∩ intXy∅ , so∫
∂U˜ǫ
u˜(p)〈Dq a˜, nˆ〉f˜(p)dS(p)
= ǫ
∫
∂U˜ǫ
〈Dqa˜, nˆ〉f˜(p)dS(p) +
∫
∂U˜ǫ∩∂Xy∅
[u˜(p)− ǫ]〈Dqa˜, nˆ〉f˜(p)dS(p)
= ǫ
∫
U˜ǫ
∇p · (f˜(p)Dq a˜(0, u˜(p), p))dp+
∫
U˜ǫ∩∂Xy∅
[u˜(p)− ǫ]〈Dqa˜, nˆ〉f˜(p)dS(p).
Since 0 ≤ u˜ ≤ ǫ in U˜ǫ, we combine the last inequality with (6.8) to obtain
(6.9) −
L˜ǫ(u˜)
ǫ
≤
∫
U˜ǫ
∣∣∇p · (f˜(p)Dqa˜(0, u˜(p), p))∣∣dp+
∫
U˜ǫ∩∂Xy∅
∣∣〈Dqa˜, nˆ〉f˜(p)∣∣dS(p).
Notice that domain monotonicity implies the ǫ → 0 limit of the last expressions above is given by
integrals over the limiting domain U˜0 = ∩ǫ>0U˜ǫ. Assume now the interior of the convex set U˜0 is
empty, so that U˜0 has dimension at most n−1. Then the volume |U˜ǫ| = o(1), hence the first integral
in the right hand side dwindles to zero as ǫ→ 0, (recalling that u˜ is Lipschitz, f˜ ∈W 1,1 and a˜ ∈ C3).
Concerning the second term, if the convex set U˜0 has dimension n− 1 then its relative interior must
be disjoint from the boundary of the convex body Xy∅ , since the latter is assumed to have no n− 1
dimensional facets. Either way U˜0 ∩ ∂Xy∅ has dimension at most n− 2, which implies that∫
U˜ǫ∩∂Xy∅
dS(p) = o(1)
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as ǫ → 0. All in all, we have shown Lǫ(u˜) = o(ǫ) as ǫ → 0 whenever U˜0 has empty interior, which
— as was explained above — contradicts the asserted optimality of the strategy u˜. However, even
if U˜0 has non-empty interior, more must be true to avoid inferring the contradictory conclusion
Lǫ(u˜) = o(ǫ) as ǫ→ 0 from (6.9): one of the two limiting integrals∫
U˜0
|∇p · (f˜(p)Dqa˜(0, u˜(p), p))|dp > 0 or
∫
U˜0∩∂Xy∅
|〈Dqa˜, nˆ〉|f˜(p)dS(p) > 0
must be non-vanishing. In either case, the W 1,1 density f˜ must be positive somewhere in U˜0, whose
interior therefore includes a positive fraction of the agents. Since u˜ is differentiable with vanishing
gradient on the interior of U˜0, there is no ambiguity in the strategy of these agents: they respond
to u˜ by choosing the null product. 
Appendix A. Minimal b-convex potentials
The purpose of this appendix is to establish a mathematical result (and some terminology) needed
in the last part of the uniqueness proof, Theorem 4.5. In particular, we establish a minimality
property enjoyed by Rochet’s construction of a b-convex function for which ∂bu contains a prescribed
set [49]; Rochet’s construction is modeled on the analogous construction by Rockafellar of a convex
function u whose subdifferential ∂u contains a given cyclically monotone set [52].
Recall a relation S ⊂ X × Y is b-cyclically monotone if for each integer k ∈ N and k-tuple of
points (x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk) ∈ S, the inequality
(A.1)
k∑
i=1
b(xi, yi)− b(xi+1, yi) ≥ 0
holds with xk+1 := x1. For a function u : X 7−→ R ∪ {+∞}, the relation ∂
bu ⊂ X × Y consists of
those points (x, y) such that
(A.2) u(·) ≥ u(x) + b(·, y)− b(x, y)
holds throughout X. Rochet’s generalization of Rockafellar’s theorem asserts that S ⊂ X × Y is
b-cyclically monotone if and only if there exists a b-convex function u : X 7−→ R ∪ {+∞} such that
S ⊂ ∂bu; see also [21] [31] [56]. Here we need to extract a certain minimality property from its proof.
Lemma A.1. Given a b-cyclically monotone S ⊂ X × Y and (x0, y0) ∈ S, there is a b-convex
function u vanishing at x0 and satisfying S ⊂ ∂
bu, which is minimal in the sense that u ≤ u˜ for all
u˜ : X 7−→ R ∪ {+∞} vanishing at x0 with S ⊂ ∂
bu˜.
Proof. Given a b-cyclically monotone S ⊂ X×Y and (x0, y0) ∈ S, Rochet [49] verified the elementary
fact that the following formula defines a b-convex function u for which S ⊂ ∂bu:
(A.3) u(·) = sup
k∈N
sup
(x1,y1),...,(xk,yk)∈S
b(·, yk)− b(x0, y0) +
k∑
i=1
b(xi, yi−1)− b(xi, yi).
Taking k = 0 shows u(x0) ≥ 0, while the opposite inequality u(x0) ≤ 0 follows from b-cyclical
monotonicity (A.1) of S. Now suppose u˜(x0) = 0 and S ⊂ ∂
bu˜. For each k ∈ N and k-tuple in S, we
claim u˜(·) exceeds the expression under the supremum in (A.3). Indeed, (xi, yi) ∈ S ⊂ ∂
bu˜ implies
u˜(xi+1) ≥ u˜(xi) + b(xi+1, yi)− b(xi, yi).
and u˜(xi) < ∞, by evaluating (A.2) at xi and at x0. Summing the displayed inequalities from
i = 0, . . . , k, arbitrariness of xk+1 ∈ X yields the desired result: u˜(xk+1) ≥ u(xk+1). 
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